The Battling Bastards of
Historical News Letter
"Jesus and Hitler Told the Truth about the Jews."
Dear kindred and fellow Aryans
Once again I have the pleasure to publish an article to
you by my friend James L Choron. I have chosen to publish this article under
Historical News Letter since it contains vital historical information
I trust you will appreciate what Mr Choron tells you.
The Battling Bastards of Bataan
James L. Choron
"The Battling Bastards of Bataan, No
Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam, No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces, No
pills, no planes, no artillery pieces, And nobody gives a damn!" lyrics by
Frank Hewlett, 1942
Sixty years ago, this June, the last of
the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" finally laid down their arms and
surrendered to the Japanese invaders of the Philippean Islands. Their
defense of the "rock" Corrigidor, is one of the genuine tributes to the
courage and determination of the American fighting man, when he is faced
with what appear to be insurmountable odds. Armed with weapons cast off from
the First World War, starving and in rags… waiting for relief that was
promised but never planned, they held out for almost four months… Guam was
occupied by the Japanese in two days, and Wake Island was occupied in two
weeks after heavy fighting by the US Naval and Marine forces. However,
Wainright's Battling Bastards stalled the Japanese timetable for conquest,
and bought the United States time… time paid for in blood and misery… for
the rebuilding of a fleet and the building of an army.
For twenty-seven days after Bataan fell,
as food and munitions ran low, as water and hope dried up, they clung to the
Rock with taloned will. Like Bataan, of which it was an extension, the tale
of Corregidor inspired a nation.
The doomed defense was a futile fight.
Depending on a fleet that never came, the sick and starved defenders,
illequipped and outnumbered, cost the invading Japanese army dearly in men
and time. Those on Bataan had decimated land, air, and naval forces needed
elsewhere, and those on Corregidor had smashed the Forth Division, in which
Japan had relied for offensives in New Guinea and the Solomons. They had
denied Homma the use of Manila Bay. From the Rock they had intercepted
messages and provided valuable intelligence regarding Japanese advance in
the Pacific by six months, protected Australia from attack, and enabled
MacArthur to mount the offensive that would win eventual victory in the
When once their story was told, it rolled
like an anthem through the land. The battlers on Bataan and the eagles on
the Rock gave hope to an embattled America, and pride for her children to
come. For theirs is the stuff of epics. It is such annals that impassion
man's will to renew the covenant of his fathers, that his republic shall
live in glory and in honor.
Contrary to the popular myth, General
Jonathan Wainwright, and not Douglas MacArthur, was the
"real" Hero of the Philippeans. Few who have ever seen it can forget the
famous painting of Wainright, tall and gaunt, in profile, wearing his
battered campaign hat, hand on hip, over the open flap of his holster...
looking out over the ocean toward America, and the fleet that, he knew,
He was the son of a cavalry officer. He
was born in Walla Walla, Washington, on 2nd August 1883, and graduated from
West Point, the United States Military Academy, in 1906 (25/78). He the
joined the 1st Cavalry Regiment and was sent to the Philippean Islands in
1909, in the aftermath of the Moro Rebellion. In 1918 Wainwright was
promoted to Chief of Staff of the 82nd Infantry Division. Later he held the
same position in the 3rd US Army. In 1936, Wainright took over command of
the 34rd Cavalry, at Fort Meyer. Two years later he was promoted to
brigadier general and in February 1940 was again sent to the Philippines to
serve under General Douglas MacArthur. Wainwright was placed in command of
the North Luzon Force.
As everyone knows, the Japanese Air Force
attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on the 7th December 1941. Most
modern readers do not realize that on the following day they carried out air
strikes on the Philippines and destroyed half of MacArthur's air force. At
the time, MacArthur was much criticized for this as he had been told to move
his airforce after the raid on Hawaii the previous day. His belief that an
attack on the Philippean Islands was "unlikely", proved to be the first of
many tactical and strategic blunders on his part, which were later masked by
a highly effective public relations campaign. At the same time, the Japanese
Army also invaded the Philippines and they soon held the three air bases in
northern Luzon. On 22nd December the Japanese 14th Army landed at Lingayen
Gulf and quickly gained control of Manila from the inexperienced Filipino
troops. Although only 57,000 Japanese soldiers were landed on Luzon it had
little difficulty capturing the island.
General Douglas MacArthur now, rather
than organizing a counter attack, using his, numerically, vastly superior
forces, ordered a general retreat to the Bataan peninsula. A series of
Japanese assaults forced the US defensive lines back and on 22nd February,
1942, MacArthur, who, in spite of overt requests to be:"left at his post",
had, in all of his correspondences with his Commander in Chief, made himself
look indispensable to the war effort in the Pacific, in the eyes of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was "ordered" to leave Bataan and go to
Australia... many, who were present believe, exactly as he had planned it
all along... It is interesting to note that MacArthur had a flotilla of
patrol boats waiting at the docks for just such an "contingency", even
though he officially denied ever "planning" to leave the Philippean Islands.
Now, this is not to be demeaning to General MacArthur.
It is perfectly understandable, on one
hand, how he would understand the principal of "living to fight another
day", and the necessity of abandoning an untenable position. There was never
any doubt as to the eventual fall of the Philippeans. From the moment of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, it was obvious to all that relief of the garrison
was impossible, at least for the foreseeable future. It is also
understandable from a political perspective, how Franklin Roosevelt, who has
been demonstrated to have had advance knowledge of both the Pearl Harbor
attack and the invasion of the Philippeans, would be reluctant to have the
commander of U.S. forces to become a prisoner of war.
Still, on the other hand, MacArthur was
not particularly well thought of by those who were left behind, and
questions concerning his motivation, character and even his patriotism were
voiced in a song penned by some of the troops of Corrigidor… The author, of
course, was at the time, and still remains, anomyous…
"Doug out Doug MacArthur lies a shaking
on the rock, With fifty feet of concrete to protect him from the shock; With
patrol boats and his Press Corps waiting stately at the docks, While his
troops go starving on".
It must be pointed out that, even with
the clear advantage that the Japanese had in technology, the combined
U.S./Filipino forces outnumbered the enemy, were holding prepared defensive
positions, and could, if properly led, have repelled the invasion. Japan did
not have the resources to reinforce Hoimma to any extent, nor did they have
the resources to launch a second invasion, should the first fail. Had the
Phillipeans been held, even at an excessive casualty rate (which could not
possibly have exceeded the numbers lost in the actual defense or in later
Japanese captivity), the entire course of the Second World War in the
Pacific would have changed.
In any case, the damage was done...
General Wainwright remained behind with just over 11,000 soldiers and
managed to hold out, on the Bataan Peninsula, until the beginning of May
1942. Wainwright was captured and took part in what became known as the
Bataan Death March. He subsequently transported to Manchukuo (Manchuria),
where he remained a prisoner until the end of the Second World War. Jonathan
Wainwright was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and on 5th September
1945 was promoted to full general. He retired from active duty on 31st
August 1947 and lived in San Antonio until his death on 2nd September 1953.
To begin to understand the fall of Bataan
and the aftermath, the Death March, one must know what led to its fall. When
the Japanese invaded the Philippine Islands in December 1941, with their
14th Army consisting of two full divisions (the 16th and 18th), five
anti-aircraft battalions, three engineering regiments, two tank regiments,
and one battalion of medium artillery, led by Lt. General Masaharu Homma,
they faced a defending force of ten divisions of the Philippine Army.
Numerically speaking, the advantage belonged to the defenders. What appears
to be an advantage, however, was in reality a disadvantage: one that
hastened the fall of Bataan and one that contributed to thousands of deaths
in O'Donnell's prison camp. At the end of the first week in December 1941,
the Philippine forces consisted of 20,000 regulars and 100,000 totally raw
reservists, most of whom were called to the colors within the three months
preceding the war. The training of their artillerymen, so vital in any
military action, did not take place until after the outbreak of hostilities.
Many of these troops were illiterate and lacked the ability to communicate
with each other. The enlisted men spoke their native dialect, depending on
the area they were from; the officers spoke English, Spanish, or the
so-called national language, Tagalog. Unfortunately, Tagalog was spoken
mainly in and around Manila, the country's capital. Weapons such as the
British Enfield rifle of World War I were obsolete. Uniforms consisted of
fiber helmets (the men were never issued steel helmets), canvas shoes,
short-sleeve shirts, and short pants, hardly suitable for the jungles of
Bataan and their surprisingly cold nights.
Now one must admit that troops such as
these, for the most part, would be ineffective in confronting a modern army,
with modern equipment. However, the sheer numbers involved, and the presence
of decent leadership, unhampered by political motivation, would have, to a
great extent, offset the disadvantages inherent in the use of "native
troops". This disadvantage could have been further offset, had the United
States taken advantage of , or had the forces present been forewarned and
allowed to take advantage of the knowledge that an attack was imminent. Even
untrained or semi-trained native levies, firing from fixed, reinforced
defenses, in sufficient numbers, could easily have pushed Hoimma's forces
back into the sea. The destruction of the available air forces, which can
only be seen as a deliberate act on the part of MacArthur, made a viable
defense against the invasion all but impossible. Even considering the age
and technology of the aircraft available on the Phillipean Islands (there
were no "modern" aircraft present, only "surplus" from the mid-thirties),
air support, of any kind, supporting the defense of the beaches would have
proven devastating to the Japanese.
In addition to the Philippine Army,
Bataan's forces consisted of 11,796 Americans and several regiments of
Philippine Scouts who had been part of the United States Army in the
Philippines for many years prior to the war. These were magnificent
soldiers, well trained, loyal, and dedicated to the war effort. Led by
American officers, they repeatedly distinguished themselves in their four
months of combat. Adding to the number of military in Bataan were civilians
who fled the advancing Japanese. They entered Bataan of their own free will,
yet they had to be fed from military supplies.
Forced to feed such a large number of
military and civilians, food became an immediate and critical problem to the
command. Tons of precious rice were left in the warehouses upon the
withdrawal into Bataan and were destroyed by the Japanese. Americans
accustomed to "stateside chow" found themselves (mid-January) on
half-rations along with the Filipino soldiers. A month later, these rations
were cut again (1,000 calories per day) and consisted of rice and fish, or
what little meat could be found. Most of the meat came from the horses and
mules of the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, or the Philippine beast of
burden, the carabao, or water buffalo. Occasionally monkeys and snakes
supplemented the diet. Malaria ran rampant in Bataan, one of the most
heavily mosquito-infested areas in the world at that time. Medication to
offset the effects of that disease began to disappear early in the campaign.
On April 3, 1942, General Homma
finally launched his long-awaited (by both the Japanese high command and the
Americans) final push to crush the Philippines. He easily broke through the
final line of resistance of the Fil-American troops on Bataan, but he did
so, mainly because of the deplorable state of health of the defending forces
On 3 April 1942 (Good Friday), after a lull in
hostilities, the Japanese attacked Bataan, with overwhelming artillery fire
which resulted in the disintegration of the Fil-American front lines, and a
collapse of organized resistance by the Fil-American forces in the II Corps
area on the eastern side of Bataan. With his troops starving, and sick from
various tropical diseases, Major General Edward P. King was forced to
surrender all Bataan Fil-American forces on 9 April 1942, (73,000 troops) in
order to save lives.
The following announcement was made over
the "Voice of Freedom" broadcasting from Corrigidor, a few days later…
"Radio Broadcast - Voice of Freedom -
Malinta Tunnel - Corregidor - April 9, 1942
"Bataan has fallen. The
Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula
have laid down their arms. With heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded
to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.
The world will long remember the epic
struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastness
and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under
the constant and grueling fire of the enemy for more that three months.
Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in
the Philippines and in America, the intrepid fighters have done all that
human endurance could bear.
For what sustained them through all
these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely
physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith--something in the heart
and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not destroy! It was the
thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of
freedom and dignity and pride in these most priceless of all our human
The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will
credit our troops with nothing less than the courage and fortitude that his
own troops have shown in battle. Our men have fought a brave and bitterly
contested struggle. All the world will testify to the most superhuman
endurance with which they stood up until the last in the face of
But the decision had to come. Men
fighting under the banner of unshakable faith are made of something more
that flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield
at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come.
Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that
made it stand--a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the
The forces on the "rock"… Corrigidor…
battled on… Corregidor an inland two miles from Bataan now faced the brunt
of Japanese artillery and bombing. For another month Corregidor held out. On
5 May 1942, the Japanese invaded Corregidor. Lieutenant General Wainwright
then sent his last radio message to President Roosevelt on 6 May 1942. Below
is the text of General Jonathan Wainright’s last official communication with
"For the President of the United
It is with broken heart and head bowed in sadness, but not
in shame, that I report to Your Excellency that I must go today to arrange
terms for the surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay: Corregidor
(Fort Mills), Caballo (Fort Hughes), El Fraile (Fort Drum), and Carabao
With anti-aircraft fire control equipment
and many guns destroyed, we are no longer able to prevent accurate aerial
bombardment. With numerous batteries of the heaviest caliber employed on the
shores of Bataan and Cavite out ranging our remaining guns, the enemy now
brings devastating cross fire to bear on us.
Most of my batteries, seacoast,
anti-aircraft and field, have been put out of action by the enemy. I have
ordered the others destroyed to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
In addition we are now overwhelmingly assaulted by Japanese troops on
Corregidor. There is a limit of human endurance and that limit has long
since been past. Without prospect of relief I feel it is my duty to my
country and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and
If you agree, Mr. President, please
say to the nation that my troops and I have accomplished all that is humanly
possible and that we have upheld the best traditions of the United States
and its Army.
May God bless and preserve you and guide you and the
nation in the effort to ultimate victory.
With profound regret and with continued
pride in my gallant troops I go to meet the Japanese commander.
Good-by Mr. President."
Naturally, Roosevelt agreed. Some would
say that it had been planned to play out this way from the beginning.
America, after all, "needed" a war. The attack on Pearl Harbor had allowed
it to begin. The fall of Bataan, and later of Corigador gave the country
"martyrs", to reinforce their desire and drive to enter into a conflict
which could have been either avoided completely or shortened extensively.
In point of fact, Roosevelt had intended,
from all apparent indications, for the United States to enter the European
War far earlier than December, 1941. This became impossible due to the
general sentiment of the American people, many of whom were openly in
sympathy with Germany. The Japanese attack which Roosevelt and his
administration made clear was a part of a "pact" between Germany and Japan,
was the pretext that was needed. Undoubtedly, such an agreement existed.
However, it was secondary to the true goal of the Roosevelt administration,
which was, first of all, to end the ongoing depression with a false, wartime
economy, secondly, to take the American public's eye off of a failing
domestic policy, and lastly, to aid in the destruction of the enemies of the
Jews, to whom Roosevelt was in debt, and by whom he was surrounded.
All of this, however, is secondary
to the topics at hand, which is how the defense of the Phillipeans failed,
and why... and the results of the aftermath.
However, General Homma refused to accept the surrender of
Corregidor and the other fortified islands unless the terms included the
surrender of all US forces in the Philippines. For about a month the
survivors of Corregidor were held hostage until all organized resistance in
the Philippines ended in June 1942; this was when all elements in the
Visayan-Mindanao Force in the Southern Philippines under the command of
Major General William F. Sharp surrendered.
Food supplies stored on Corregidor often never found their
way to the front lines of Bataan, being stolen by hungry rear area troops
while the food was enroute in trucks. Hijacking became a common practice
along the way. Here may be found the first difference between Bataan and
Corregidor. Corregidor troops did not go hungry until their capture by the
Japanese. Consequently, the men of Corregidor entered captivity in
relatively good health and with very few cases of malaria on record.
Such differences were to have a major
impact on who was to survive the prison camps that were to follow. Comparing
rosters of units serving on Bataan and Corregidor, it was determined that
the chances of surviving imprisonment were two in three, if captured on
Corregidor, and one in three if captured on Bataan, an obvious
substantiation of the differences between the two groups at the time of
On Corregidor, there were 15,000 American
and Filipino troops, consisting of anti-aircraft and coastal defenses, along
with the Fourth Marine Regiment, recently arrived from China (December
1941), less a detachment stationed on Bataan, as part of a Naval Battalion.
Despite some writings to the contrary, again dealing in "legends," the
Fourth Marine Regiment did not participate in the defense of Bataan. Their
mission was beach defense on Corregidor. Approximately 43 Marines arrived in
Camp O'Donnell after completing the Death March.
Of the 11,796 American soldiers on Bataan
on April 3,1942, about 1,500 remained wounded or sick in Bataan's two field
hospitals after the surrender. Others, relatively few, made their way across
the two miles of shark-infested waters to Corregidor, where they were
assigned to beach defense. About 9,300 Americans reached Camp O'Donnell
after completing the Death March. About 600-650 Americans died on the March.
Of the 66,000 Filipino troops, Scouts, Constabulary and Philippine Army
units, it can be said the approximately 2,500 of them remained in the
hospitals of Bataan; about 1,700 of them escaped to Corregidor, and a small
number of them remained on Bataan as work details for the Japanese after the
Those captured on Bataan on or about
April 9,1942, were in the general area of the town of Mariveles, at the
southern tip of the Bataan peninsula. Large fields outside this town were
used as staging areas for the thousands of captives, American and Filipino,
Mass confusion reigned in these areas and
when darkness fell, it became impossible to recognize anyone. In a brief
period of time buddies were soon separated and, in many cases, never to see
one another again. It was not uncommon for two friends from the same unit to
enter one of these fields not know of each other's survival for over 40
Each morning, groups of several hundred
would be hustled out on Bataan's, one time, concrete road (National Road)
leading north out of the peninsula and began the exodus to prison camp. No
design or plans for the group ever materialized. Each sunrise, shouting,
shooting, bayoneting, by Japanese, would assemble anyone they could to make
up the marching groups.
As a result, individuals generally found
themselves among perfect strangers, even if they were fellow Americans.
Consequently, a "dog eat dog, every man for himself" attitude soon
prevailed. Few helped one another on the March. Those belonging to the same
military unit were fortunate, with their buddies helping when needed.
During one group's march, volunteers were
sought to carry a stretcher containing a colonel wounded in both legs and
unable to walk. Four men offered to help. After hours of carrying the man in
a scorching hot sun with no stops and no water, they asked for relief from
other marchers. No one offered to pick up the stretcher. Soon, the original
four bearers, put down the man and went off on their own. The colonel was
last seen by the side of the road begging to be carried by anyone.
After the first day of marching,
without food or water, men began to drop out of column. Japanese guards
would rush up, shouting commands in Japanese to get back in the group. When
that approach failed, shots rang, out killing those who would not or could
not rise. Many of those failing to obey the order to march were beheaded by
sword wielding-Japanese guards, usually officers and non-coms.
Such actions on the part of the Japanese brought many
captives to their feet and they continued the march for awhile longer. As
each day and night passed without water, the marchers began to break from
their group to run to anything that resembled water. Most often they would
hurl themselves into a water puddle alongside of the road and lap up,
similar to a cat lapping milk from a saucer, the so-called water. The
puddles were used by the carabao to coat themselves with mud as a protection
against the huge flies constantly about them. Upon rising from the puddle,
the water would assume a "clear" state. Needless to say, the water was not
potable and drinking of it soon brought on cramps, diarrhea, and eventually
dysentery caused by the numerous flies found in the puddle. Such acts
continued for each day of the March, lasting from five to ten days,
depending upon where one joined the March, and continued until the marchers
reached the town of San Fernando, Pampamga, P.I., a distance for most
marchers of over 100 kilometers.
Upon reaching San Fernando, the prisoners
were forced into 1918 model railroad boxcars (40X8) used in France during
World War I. With over 100 men in each car, the Japanese then closed the
doors on the prisoners. There was no room to sit down or fall down. Men died
in the sweltering cars. Upon arriving in Capas, Tarlac, almost four hours
later, the men detrained for Camp O'Donnell, another ten kilometer walk.
Official figures estimate that
between 44,000 and 50,000 of the Filipinos arrived at O'Donnell after
completing the March. Between 12,000 and 18,000 of their number are
unaccounted for. What happened to them is unknown, but a safe guess is that
between 5,000 to 10,000 of them lost their lives on the Death March. The
death toll for both Filipinos and Americans, however, did not cease upon
reaching O'Donnell. Instead, during the first forty days of that camp's
existence, more that 1,500 Americans were to die. At least 25,000 Filipinos
died by July 1942 in the same camp. All of the deaths were the direct result
of malnutrition on Bataan, disease, and the atrocities committed by the
Japanese on the March.
Shortly after the last of these prisoners entered
O'Donnell (April 24,1942), Corregidor fell on May 6. Battered by constant
shell fire from Bataan and aerial bombardment, with their supplies running
out, Wainwright, successor to MacArthur as commanding officer of the United
States forces in the Philippines, decided his situation was hopeless and
surrendered Corregidor and the troops in the southern part of the
Philippines. With the establishing of a beach head on Corregidor by the
Japanese, he avoided a "bloodbath" that would have most certainly occurred
had the Japanese fought their way from the beach to Malinta Tunnel, where
most of the defenders of the island had withdrawn.
After two weeks of the famous Japanese
"sun treatment" for prisoners, in the sun-baked areas of Corregidor, these
troops were taken across Manila Bay to Manila and then by train to Prison
camp Cabanatuan, Cabanatuan, P.I. The men were in that camp when the Bataan
survivors arrived from Camp O'Donnell in June 1942. The extremely high death
rate in that camp prompted the Japanese to make such a move, and thereby
allowed the American medical personnel to treat the Filipino prisoners
remaining behind until their release beginning in July 1942. The condition
of the prisoners arriving in Cabanatuan was such as to shock their fellow
Americans from Corregidor. In a short period of time, however, they, too,
would feel the full effects of Japanese captivity.
It was not, however, until June
1942 that the men of Bataan and Corregidor began to share a common
experience. During the first nine months of Cabanatuan's existence, when the
vast majority of the camp's 3,000 American deaths occurred, most of the
deaths were men of Bataan, still suffering from the effects of Bataan, the
Death March, and Camp O'Donnell. That the men of Corregidor were more
fortuitous than their fellow Americans in avoiding starvation, pestilence,
and atrocities up to this point is beyond question.
After the surrender of the Fil-American forces on Bataan,
the Japanese began to march the starving, sick, and wounded survivors to
Camp O'Donnel over 100 miles away. This event has become known as the "Bataan
Death March." Bataan survivors were robbed of personal effects, denied food
and water, or received very little; soldiers that could not keep up with the
pace were, bayoneted, shot, or beheaded. The number of soldiers beaten
and/or executed by the Japanese was in the thousands before the march was
The loss of the Philippines to the Japanese, was the
largest single defeat of American Armed Forces in history. This loss was not
the result of a lack efforts by our the soldiers and sailors, but rather a
lack of preparedness of the United States as a whole. The United States
underestimated the Japanese, and we were not willing as a nation to keep our
armed forces trained and ready to protect the interests of the United States
and its people. The defense of the Philippines is not talked about or
studied very much in today's society, and its lessons may go unlearned if we
do not remember the sacrifices made the men and women we asked to defend
them and us. These brave soldiers and sailors bought us time to prepare our
defenses and take the offensive in the Pacific. Their stubborn sacrifices
forced the Japanese to commit more forces than they originally planned to
the conquest of the Philippines which denied them their use in making their
drive of conquest south of the Philippines.
Upon his release from a Japanese Prisoner
of War Camp after over three years in captivity, and at the request of
General of Army Douglas MacArthur; Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright
appeared at the surrender of the Japanese Empire to the Allies on the deck
of the battleship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay . On his way back to the United
States, he was promoted to General. A few days after arriving in the United
States, General Wainwright was asked to visit the White House by President
Truman, and in a ceremony held in the rose garden, General Jonathan M.
Wainwright was presented the "Medal of Honor" for his actions while
commanding the Northern Luzon Forces, I Corps on Bataan, and all United
States Forces in the Philippines. During his time as a Prisoner of War,
General Wainwright expected to be court marshaled upon his return to the
United States, but instead he found a grateful nation who was proud to have
him back. Unfortunately, the only thing anyone ever remembers about General
Wainwright, is his role in the surrender of the Philippine Islands to the
Japanese in 1942. If America had been properly prepared to fight and defend
its territory, the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines
might never have happened. With the fall of the Philippines, over 70,000
(50,000 Filipino, 20,000 American) soldiers, sailors, and airmen became
prisoners of the Japanese, not to mention the civilian internees. At the end
of World War II, nearly 37% of all POWs lost their lives as a result of the
way the Japanese treated their captives. How many people remember the POWs
and what they did for our country? Officially the United States Government
presented each surviving POW the monetary sum of $1.00 a day for each day of
captivity (approximately $1,000) above their normal pay and… unfortunately…
not much more.
It is interesting to note that in
the surrender ceremonies, General Wainright is not wearing his sidearm, and
in every known photograph, refuses to look at MacArthur. In many cases, the
look on the General's face is one of absolute disgust. One must question
which presence he found to be more offensive, that of his "official" enemies
and former captors, or that of his "commanding officer".
If Jewish audacity/swindle, Chuzpe, is right, then
resistance must be a national duty.
heil og sæl
Top of historical Newsletter