Incompetent Generals Norwegian WW2 History
Volume 2
2000
Dear friends
To-day I give you the story of the Norwegian General Staff why they could
not defend the country from invasion or hinder the Germans from overtaking the
country.
If you have a map of Norway to hand, this will help you when reading the
events outlined in the HNL below.
THE GENERAL DISASTER OF THE GENERAL STAFF
It could be said that no country in the world has ever had a more incompetent
general staff than Norway had 1940, and that no country has suffered so much
because their general staff were incompetent. Historically speaking the
general staff was as much to blame for the situation of April 9 1940, as was
the government.
A national government is responsible for the political management of a
country. The military management, the general staff, have the responsibility
to prepare the defence of the country in case a war breaks out, a war that
might menace the country. To protect the country, prepare the defence, is a
unalterable task for any general staff regardless of the length of time since
the last war or the government's willingness to defend the country. A general
staff should also be prepared for all potential attacks from any enemy that
might be a danger to the country. Particularly for a neutral country it is
important that the general staff know their responsibilities and prepare for
the task of defending their country's neutrality.
In order to excuse the ineptitude of his military colleagues, many of whom had
been his school friends at the military academy, General Ruge placed the whole
and complete responsibility on the Government of Prime Minister Nygaardsvold
for the debacle of April 9, 1940. In a letter dated September 9, 1947 to Prime
Minister Gerhardsen (the letter was in part printed in Morgenbladet, a
Norwegian News paper, on June 16, 1948):
General Ruge stated Quote
"The government is in duty bound to at any time be in clearness over and
together with their military advisers to thoroughly discuss all aspects of our
possible war alternatives, the demands the different strategies place upon our
defence, the military's possibility to fulfil these demands, the actions which
must be taken to fill the lacks which for the moment be in the defensive
capability, what time and efforts must be changed to carry through these
actions."
If the government lead by Nygaardsvold since 1935, had undertaken their duty
every year to take seriously and sincere discussions regarding the country's
military preparedness Norway would not have been in such a bad situation as
was in 1939. He who knows his position and possibilities can easier and with
higher speed and more efficiency do the things that need to be done then he
who has not been prepared...
If the Government in the spring of 1940 had devoted itself to the question of
mobilisation and the time it takes to mobilise a country, then the defensive
capability would have been far stronger on the eve of April 9th 1940.
(In this context please read Historical News letter "APRIL 9, 1940 - A
sad daay for Nptway )
General Ruge knew which duties the military leadership had vis-à-vis the
government. The fact is that the general staff, for the both the army and
navy, before WWII had not fulfilled their tasks. Even worse was that General
Ruge passed the blame for the wretched situation onto the government. The
general staff had the responsibility to inform the government and make sure
they understood and knew what the problems of the defence of Norway were and
what the defence of a country needed from the government.
After WWII the military and political leadership in Norway had a common
enemy whom they could blame for all their failures, Nasjonal Samling. This
political party was made the scapegoat for Norway on April 9, 1940. As a
result of this none of the General staff underwent a court-martial after WWII.
The government knew that they could not open lawsuits against all members of
NS for treason and at the same time court-martial the general staff.
In the autumn of 1939 the military leaders of Norway got "their man," Colonel
Birger Ljungberg, as defence minister. With Ljungberg the general staff had a
colleague to speak to but they still did not manage to perform their roles
adequately. Ljundberg in spite of being a good and capable officer had never
served in the general staff, he had not the qualifications required. This
excused Ljundberg shortcomings - he claimed failure of communication between
the general staff and the government as the cause of Norway's disaster.
As a background to the behaviour of the general staff around April 1940, it is
worth noting what took place at a meeting in The Military Society in Oslo some
days before April 9: Captain Øyvind Øi, Oeyvind Oie, gave a speech to the
society with the title "The strategic attack". At the address Oie described
the attack which struck Norway shortly after. This, Oie's insight into the
problems of strategic attacks, makes it incomprehensible to understand why the
General Staff were not prepared. Captain Oie was a well-known man to the
general staff; Oie was a member of Commanding General Kristian Laake's
adjutant branch. The general Staff could not disclaim responsibility in light
of this speech despite the newspaper Arbeiderbladet - organ for the Labour
party and the government - describing the address as negative ideas a senior
official should desist from.
The government as well as Stortinget (Parliament) had counted on Norway being
able to restore the military strength which the destructive politics of the
twenties and beginning of thirties had brought, before any foreign forces
could reach Norwegian territory. This falsehood could not free the general
staff from their responsibilities; they were responsible irrespective of the
policies of the government to prepare for every thinkable and unthinkable
attack on the country that they were set to defend.
During the negotiations before the breaking up of the union with Sweden in
1905. The Swedish general staff advised their government to demand that all
Norwegian fortifications along the Swedish-Norwegian border should not hold
any military installations and that Norwegian military should not train their
troops within 5 miles of the Swedish Norwegian border. These demands were
incorporated into the agreement, which is the reason why no Norwegian
fortifications since 1905 have had any military installations along that
border. The passages in the agreement from 1905 were "removed" at the end of
the 1980'ies. Norway's general staff had remembered and adhered to this clause
even if the politicians had forgotten. By this example it can be seen one of
the tasks a general staff have in time of peace in the political process and
the importance of having a general staff that can think and plan. Since these
tasks are so important only the best military minds of a country should serve
on the general staff. This was not the case in Norway 1940.
Norway faced potential attack in 1940 from the following:
- From land (by Sweden, Soviet Union or Finland)
- From the ocean (by all sea-going nations of the world)
As Norway was at peace with Sweden and since Sweden only had military forces
meant for defence it was hardly imaginable that an attack could come from
Sweden. The relations between the two countries were very good. Of course an
alien power could have first invaded Sweden and then attacked Norway. Also
unthinkable was that Finland should invade Norway. An attack on Norway through
Finish territory would have to put Finland out of action before Norway could
be invaded. Norway did not have a border with Soviet Union before 1940. In the
autumn of 1939 the Norwegian forces in Finnmark, a county in Northeast of
Norway were strengthened. These troops were then in constant training from
October to April, this was particularly so after Finland had capitulated to
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was thus the only country that was likely
to attack Norway via the land, but would have had very long lines of supplies.
The Soviet invasion of Finland had resulted in very large scale casualties and
the red army was being honed for Operation Thunderclap, the intended invasion
of central Europe.
From the sea Norway could be attacked through many ways. The fortifications
along the coastline were strong. To defend Norway from attacks from the sea
should have been easy in 1940 that is if all fortifications had been armed
sufficiently with canons, torpedoes, mines, soldiers and other necessities.
Norway is easy to defend the climate is harsh and works against attackers
during the winter - thus it was in 1940.
Since the beginning of October 1939 British warships had violated Norwegian
waters without any response from the government. Such behaviour could not
continue without some reaction from the Germans. When one knows what happened
in Jøssingfjorden in February 1940, see HNL No.12, it is incomprehensible why
the general staff did not demand that the army and navy were mobilised
immediately and showed no will to preserve Norway's neutrality.
Norway's strategically important places for any aggressor were:
:
- Trondheim, city situated in the middle of the country, with two
airfields, ship yards and junction for all transport between north and south.
Trondheim lays 500 km north of Oslo, has a good harbour and in 1940 50.000
inhabitants. From all the wars with Sweden the general staff should have been
aware of this city's importance. Those who controlled this city could dominate
all traffic between north and south, not only by roads but also along the
cost.
It should have been easily anticipated that Trondheim would be an important
target for any attacker.
- Narvik, town in the north some 940-km by road north of Trondheim,
very good harbour - always free of ice. Port for shipment of iron ore from
Sweden. In a war this metal is of great importance to all belligerents,
particularly because the ore from Sweden was very high quality. Norway had in
September 1939 declared herself neutral, so all belligerents were potential
attackers of that town. In this situation the military should have thoroughly
prepared the defence of this town.
- Bergen, some 500 km west of Oslo, is the central point on the west
cost, also an administration centre for all of West-Norway. Bergen had great
importance for the control of the fairway along the cost of Norway, especial
for transport from Narvik. The city had almost 60.000 inhabitants in 1940, and
was also a naval base with an airfield. This city was also of special interest
to all belligerents.
- Stavanger, a city on the south-wets coast of Norway with 30.000
inhabitants in 1940 some 580 km west of Oslo and 160 km south of Bergen. This
was the city closest to England on the Norwegian coast. >From Stavanger one
could reach far out into the Atlantic Ocean both with aircraft and ships. One
could more or less dominate the North Atlantic convoys from Stavanger. Even
during WWI convoys to and from USA/Britan were of great importance to all
belligerents. The importance of Stavanger for the warfare in the North
Atlantic was paramount.
· -Kristiansand, a city in the south of Norway some 252 km south of
Stavanger and 360 south of Oslo with 20.000 inhabitants in 1940. From
Kristiansand one could guard/hinder the traffic in and out of the Skagerakk -
the sea between Norway and Denmark. During WWI the German fleet were locked in
the Baltic because Germany did not have free access to Skagerakk. The
strategic naval importance was still great in 1940.
- Oslo capital of Norway, approximately 70.000 inhabitants in 1940. All
the main administration was in Oslo, Government, Starting, Norse Bank - Bank
of Norway, telegraph and telephone were administrated from Oslo. The general
staff should have anticipated an attack on Oslo and Horten. Horten was located
some 90 km Southwest of Oslo on the West Side of Oslofjorden. Horten was the
main naval base for all of East- Norway.
The significance of Trondheim was proven in the early days of April 1940. The
two airfields, Lade and Værnes, were of vital importance for the German battle
plans, without them lieutenant-general Dietl's troops would never have
received any supplies and would have had to surrender to the forces from
Norway/UK and France. The two airfields outside Trondheim and their
reconstruction during April and May 1940 will be dealt with in a later letter.
Based on the above it is remarkable to read what major general Rangvald
Roscher-Nielsen wrote on page 164 in a book "Norges krig 1940 - 45" (Norway's
war 1940 - 45) issued by Gyldendal Forlag 1947. In a rather bombastic way he
describes the general staff he from 1936 was a member of: "The plans for
defence of Norway were based on other assumptions then those that occurred
April 9, 1940. Everything that had been prepared had to be scrapped. New plans
had to be improvised, but this was not easy as the enemy occupied the
administrative centre. Even the countries strongest broadcaster was in the
hands of the enemy."
This was defeatism and a military leader should never have displayed such
thoughts. But in the socialistic Norway and with a labour party that was
financed by the communists in Russia everything became possible, (Regarding
the finance of Labour Party see HNL No. 9: Documents from Stortinget in spring
of 1932.). The amazing thing is that nobody asked the general staff what their
defence plans were - where they anticipated the agressor would start an attack
and how they would stop him or hinder him. From major general Roscher Nielsen
we know the general staff did not anticipate an enemy coming from the sea,
neither did they anticipate that the largest cities/towns would be attacked.
No air attack was anticipated either.
The evidence of this is that there was no minelaying or in other ways
employed to hinder the use of the airfields in southern Norway.
In light of the above quote from Roscher Nielsen one must considerthe fact
that all members of the general staff had read admiral Wolfgang Wegener's book
"Die Seestrategi des Weltkrieges" (The naval strategy of the WW) issued in
Germany 1929. This book explains how Germany in a new war will hinder their
naval fleet from being looked in the Baltic Sea. Admiral Wegener's interest is
to show how Germany's harbours shall be open to serve the German need of
supplies. Further he looks at the possibility of German naval fleet to operate
near the British shore. Admiral Wegener says Norway's coastline is of great
important for Germany, he even says that by being master of the Norwegian cost
one can stop/hinder contact between UK, USA and Soviet Union. Retrospectively
one can say Admiral Wegener was correct in his assumptions. Admiral Raeder was
interested in Wegener's ideas, he even said that the occupation of Norway was
Wegener's idea. (This should free Quisling from the allegations that he urged
Hitler to occupy Norway when he visited Germany in December 1939. In fact
Quisling visited Hitler to stop the war. A friend of Quisling, Fredrik Prytz,
visited Churchill. Churchill did not want to hear of any stop to the warfare.)
Norway was in 1940 an easy country to defend against attacks from the ocean.
Consider what happened during the British campaign at Gallipoli in 1915. The
campaign at Gallipoli was Churchill's he even advised the Turks of his
intentions nearly three weeks before. The lesson of the British-French fiasco
at Gallipoli should have been noted by the Norwegian general staff, both the
naval and army, in planning the defence of Norway.
During the spring, summer, autumn and winter of 1915 a small Turkish force
withstood attacks from a large French and British army. During the first
attack 60.000 Turkish soldiers withstood 120.000 French and British troops.
Prior to the attack the British fleet had shelled Gallipoli for over 21 days.
Three British destroyers were sunk and mines the Turks sent out from the
Dardanelles destroyed two more. The battle at Gallipoli was a disaster for the
Allied fleet. During the Dardanelles campaign Britain and France lost over
250.000 soldiers while the Turks lost 300.000 soldiers (Encyclopaedia
Britannica) during the year long campaign.
The Norwegian general staff could easily have seen that the Turks way of
defending Gallipoli could have been used in defending Norway against all
attackers in WWII. But as history showed the general staff had not done their
homework. Other countries military leaders had learned from the mistakes that
others had made, but not in Norway. Churchill would not have wanted another
Gallipoli and Hitler would have been unlikely to involve Germany against
British attacks on Norway.
By simple calculation the general staff could have known how many ships would
be engaged in an attack on Norway from all possible aggressors. This could
have been done by carefully estimating how many soldiers were needed to
overrun the various cities, towns and fortresses along the coastline. The
topography of Norway, the size of the coastline and the distance to the
various naval bases of the attackers meant that all invaders must carry with
them a lot of equipment and supplies. Such attributes favoured the defenders.
With some planning these conditions could have been exploited to make Norway
virtually impregnable. Any airborne assault would have been difficult due to
the winter weather conditions and the lack of flat landing areas, which would
have been easy to disrupt.
Britain and France from the start of the war planned a campaign in Scandinavia
- this was because France wanted to draw the Germans away from French soil.
The British political establishment backed its cohorts in the French political
establishment, to spread the war against Germany. Churchill had this plan to
disrupt Swedish iron ore traffic being sent to Germany, as well as several
other ideas left over from and rejected during the First World War. Through
out the autumn of 1939 Britain prepared for combat on Norwegian soil through
the intended operations Stratford and Avonmouth. Stratford was the codename
for the attack on South-Norway and Avonmouth the plan to attack Narvik.
One of the main emphases of the direction that Norway took was due to the fact
that she was not genuinely neutral, and did not intend to protect her
neutrality. Through IC Hambro the Jewish president of the Storting Norway had
become bound to the Zionist influences that backed Winston Churchill such as
Lord Rothschild and Sir Richard Whaley-Cohen the president of the British
Board of Deputies of Jews. These people had since March the 24th
1933 declared open war upon on Germany, and sought any route to attack
Germany.
The simple incompetence of the military authorities was shown in several ways;
such as the moment when a mobilisation should have been ordered to orchestrate
sufficient manpower/soldiers to defend the country. The general staff had not
informed the government of the different alternatives available during the
chaos, at the time mobilisation was needed. In stead of sending the
mobilisation order by radio this vital message was posted as ordinary mail.
The general staff failed to tell the government how much time they required to
mobilise, if this was to be done by post. By pre-empting the typical political
behaviour of the regime in Norway the general staff could have circumvented
some of the government's shortcomings with common sense. Between the
incompetence of the Generals and the weak leadership of the Norwegian
government the disaster of April 1940 was hatched. The general staff were the
principle advisors to the Ministry of Defence. This task was of great
important during the time of the great international tensions of autumn,
winter and spring 1939/40.
It is worth noting who worked in the general staff before April 9, 1940:
- Head of the general staff was Colonel Rasmus Hatledal. Hatledal is
known for his attempt to get the government to mobilise before April 9, 1940.
He was not persistent enough and his attempts did not lead to any
mobilisation. Hatledal was responsible for the set up of the General
Headquarters in case of war. These plans proved unworkable.
- Lieutenant-colonel Ragnvald R. Nielsen was head of the operational
department in the
General staff. R. Roscher-Nielsen signed the Norwegian surrender in Trondheim
on
June 10, 1940.
- Lieutenant-colonel Wrede Holm was head of the foreign department in
the general staff. Wrede Holm signed the capitulation between Norwegian troops
outside Narvik and the German troops under general Dietl's command on June 10,
1940. As long as he lived Wrede Holm claimed he told general Dietl that King
Haakon and the government would continue the war from outside Norway. But
Wrede Holm forgot to write this into the agreement he and Dietl signed at
Spionskop.
- Kristian Laake was a commanding general but also member of the
general staff. Laake should have left the general staff on the morning of
April 9, 1940 - he had reached his pensionable age, but agreed to stay on as
head of the general staff. His follower was general
- Otto Ruge became commanding general in the evening of April 9,
1940.This is what Roscher-Nielsen says about general Ruge after Ruge was
appointed to commanding general, "Norges krig 1940-45":
"This was an appointment which was highly needed to increase the confidence of
the general staff both in the army and with the public. Ruge's name had arose
dispute in connection with the army organisation of 1933, but his personality,
his abilities and moral power was widely accepted."
The army organisation of 1933 stipulated that soldiers should only serve as
recruits for 7 weeks. There was to be no conscription in Norway, only a
volunteer army.
It is not possible to now how capable a general Ruge was; he never got an
opportunity to show his operational ability. His reputation in Norway is
immense, and he is thought of as a great soldeir. What we know about general
Ruge is that he after WWII he would not concede that Norway totally lost the
war with Germany and had to capitulate. He did not admit to a total
capitulation, in spite of the surrender in Trondheim on June 10. 1940, and
despite the order he got from King Haakon and the Government - to capitulate.
This intransigence in company with the various military errors will be the
historical appraisal of General Ruge. Neither Ruge nor the general staff
showed any great qualities during Norwegian campaign. Germany took a
comparably long time to put the Norwegian army out of action this was largely
due defiance of the volunteer soldiers and German problems related to supplies
the loss of the heavy cruiser Blücher in Oslofjorden. Blücher was sunk by a
lucky shot from an 80-year-old canon. The Germans had problems in their
campaign at Narvik, and also during their campaign in South-Norway failing to
advance as quickly as they could have done. The Germans said they came as
friends to Norway; when studying their campaign in Norway and the way they
treated Norwegians one must come to the conclusion that they really did come
as friends. They did utilise the scale of force that they used in the
West-European campaign in May-June 1940.
INFORMATION NOT ACTED UPON
Here is a list of some of the warnings received prior to the German and the
British attacks on Norway. Despite the Norwegian regime looking upon Britain
as allies, the British came as aggressors. Britain and France wanted to move
the German focus from France to Norway. These are some of the warnings Norway
got:
- February 16, British warships sank The Altmark.
- March 19: Churchill says Norway will soon be part of the war
- March 25: The German Ambassador visits Minister of Foreign Affair Koht and
tells him Germany would, if Norway could not, protect Norway's neutrality.
- March 29: The Norwegian Ambassador to Germany, Scheel, writes in a letter:
"There are not sign of peace. Norway most keep her defence at the utmost
alert"
- March 29. And days to follow: Newspapers all over the world state that the
Allies will soon attack Norway
- April 1: Minister Scheel reports that German troops are being loaded into
ships at Stettin with Norway as the destination.
- April 3: The Norwegian ambassador to Britain Mr. Colban sends a telegram to
the government and tells them that a distinguished member of The House of
Commands has said that the British Government is preparing for a campaign
against Narvik and the iron ore traffic from the town.
- April 5
- - Telegram from Berlin regarding the possibility of German occupation of
some towns on the Norwegian West Coast
- - Telegram from Denmark and Ambassador Esmach regarding German danger for
some towns in South of Norway
- - Telegram from the Swedish general staff regarding possible German attack
on Denmark and Norway
- - Threatening notes England and France regarding Norwegian neutrality
- April 7: telegram from the embassy in Berlin regarding large transports of
German troops leaving Stettin with a westerly course
- April 8 morning:
- - Notes from the allies regarding British warships and the mines they placed
in Norwegian waters (outside Oslofjorden)
- - Telegram from Denmark regarding German ships with course northerly out of
Kategat (water between Denmark and Sweden)
- - Noon: telegram regarding German troops from the ship "Rio de Janeiro", the
ship was torpedoed outside Lillesand (close to Kristiansand). The soldiers
said they were going to Bergen to defend the city from British attacks
- - 18.00: telegram from the embassy in London regarding German warships seen
in the Atlantic with course for Narvik
Even with this information, as well as the undisclosed intelligence
information the general staff would have been likely to receive there was
still no order to mobilise using the radio. In spite of what was obvious the
general staff casually went home to their wives and children in the evening of
April 8 1940.
The duty officer that night was Captain L. C. Rolstad. On 01.00 on April 9
1940 the head of general staff Colonel Hatlestad arrived at his office. Due to
the developing situation, Hatlestad decided to move the operational office
from The Ministry of Defence (Akershus Festning - Akershus Fortress in the
middle of Oslo) to Hotel Slemdal some three km away from Akershus Festning. By
05.00 on April 9 the supposed best officers Norway had had failed to check if
the hotel had vacant rooms before they moved. General Laake arrived in his
civil clothes. When he realised that a war had started, he went home to
Strømmen, some 15 km north of Oslo, to fetch his uniform!.
When the general staff minus general Hatlestad arrived at Hotel Slemdal they
learned that the hotel did not have any vacant rooms for them. The officers
then took taxis to Eidsvoll - a small village some 90-km north of Oslo, to get
to Eidsvoll one has to pass Strømmen where Hatlestad lived. On leaving Hotel
Slemdal the general staff made a sterling blunder by again not telling anybody
where they were going, nor did they as their own operational plans called for
leave a person at the last operational headquarter to inform that they had
moved to a new headquarter.
This caused chaos, when commanding general Hatlestad arrived at Slemdal in a
taxi at 07.00. Hatlestad sent the taxi away without checking if the general
staff was there. As he learned that the general staff had left he could not
find a new taxi. The Germans were invading the country as the commanding
general roamed the streets between Slemdal and Akershus Festning looking for
his staff.
Laake finally took the train to Eidsvoll and arrived there late in the morning
of April 9. Arriving at Eidsvoll he found the general staff in complete
turmoil. General Laake as head of the general staff must take full
responsibility for the blunder and chaos that came over the general staff. He
should have sent a young officer for the uniform; he should have left a
soldier at Akershus Festning and one at Slemdal Hotel to inform the
whereabouts of the staff. A consequence of these blunders was that no one knew
where the general staff was, and while the country was being invaded no one
knew how to contact those whom were responsible for the co-ordination of the
national defence strategy. To Hatlestad's defence one must say that he took
the initiative to call in more soldiers than the government had mobilised.
Another quotation from Roscher Nielsen states: "The defence of the country had
to be improvised." The first thing the general staff did was effectively hide.
By doing so nobody could ask them for orders. After they had hidden, the
general staff got police authority in the unoccupied area of the country. They
then started arresting all possible spies. As long as they were engaged in
these secondary tasks they did not have the capacity to organise the
defences."
General Liljedahl, chief for defence of area around Kriestiansand, could not
get hold of the commanding general.
But General Ruge had good contact to the political leaders, and met with them
regularly.
The general staff now became known as Army Headquarters HOK. HOK made no
attempts to contact Infantry Regiment, IR3 which was stationed at Kongsberg,
some 82 km west of Oslo. They wanted to hold IR3 in resrve. This blunder led
to IR3 falling into German hands without ever being in combat. According to
Roscher Nielsen the HOK had great exception to IR3. If the commanding general
had been a man of greater ability he would have realised that IR3 had to be
moved as soon as the war started. At Kongsberg Norway had a factory for
weapons. This factory was not destroyed and fell into German hands, the
officer whom was responsible for the factory said he could not give the
Germans any weapons, he locked the door and went home. Remarkably the Germans
honoured this, and the factory was locked until after the surrender on June 10
1940. There was also an ordnance factory at Raufoss - some 120 km north of
Oslo. This factory was also ignored by the HOK. The Norwegian chief of this
factory said he would not deliver ammunition, as it would be use against
Norwegian troops. The Germans respected this and did not remove any stocks
from there until after June the 10th . What one hardly can believe in this
connection is that the Germans, whom were described after the war as gruesome
and inhuman, behaved in Norway so benevolently. Might it be that the gruesome
people in the war were the accusers not the accused? At least the Norwegian
people experienced that the Germans were men of honour by personal experience.
This did not stop certain sections of Norwegian society from joining the
Zionist- howling chorus after the war.
HOK did not ask the 1. Division to move from Østfold east of Oslo - to
Eidsvoll. No 1. Division defended unimportant sectors. This division later
fled to Sweden at the first sight of a German soldier, and Norway lost 3000
soldiers and a lot of officers and one general. It would have been useful if
these soldiers had been at Eidsvoll and part of the counter attacke, which
General Ruge finally started. Ruge began fighting north of Lillehammer - some
185 km north of Oslo. This was a good place, because the valley of
Guldbrandsdalen is narrow and easy to defend. He failed to have all bridges in
Østerdalen - valley east of Lillehammer leading north destroyed. Doing this
would have stooped any German troops from getting into his rear by going that
way. The snow was deep and the roads very bad in the spring of 1940. To build
obstructions on Riksvei 3 - road in Østerdalen - would have been easy but was
overlooked. The Germans were eventually able to walk all the way to Trondheim
through Østerdal.
The Military High Command failed to undertake a cohesive strategy against the
invaders but displayed great zeal in chasing spies and rumours of informers.
The energies wasted in these usually unfounded pursuits were typical of the
HOK's mishandling of the crisis. By planning and mobilising for war in autumn
1939 the situation of April would have been highly unlikely have taken place
and Norway could have stayed neutral.
Germany needed a neutral Norway to secure iron ore from Sweden. There is no
proof that Germany would not have respected Norway's neutrality as long as
Britain had done the same. Clearly those in charge in Britain and France did
not want Norway to stay neutral, hence Winston Churchill and the French
Foreign Minister Reynaud drawing up their plans to invade Norway. Any neutral
country in a period of war should be impartial to the belligerents of both
sides. The Norwegian government frequently overlooked transgressions of
Norwegian territories by the Allies, though after the war this was obscured by
claims of similar acts by the Germans though never proved.
The Allied military force that was sent was totally unsuited to operate in an
Arctic climate
From the outset the expedition was beset with weather problems. The original
landing places chosen were too bad for the intended landing. Eventually the
force came to Åndalsnes - some 460 north west of Oslo, but neither the
airforce and or army units landed had suitable equipment for a war in a land
of snow and ice. But these troops had Norwegian military maps.
The German troops did only have maps they had found in German travelling
brochures.
One consequence of the Germans arriving before the Allies could get
established was that much of the ferocity of war that was experienced
elsewhere in Europe was avoided. Quickly the German foresight and planning
rendered further campaigning in Norway as untenable to the Allies. However the
loss of neutrality and the long term consequences are still evident today.
Such was the level of political experience and maturity of Norway's parliament
and people, that it proved as events show to be no match for the Zionist
intrigues and machinations. Initially weakened by the communist and socialist
attempts to destabilise the country in the twenties and thirties to turn
Norway communist state. The Zionist President of Storting, I.C Hambro and his
international cohorts such Winston Churchill then used the Norwegian people as
part of their cynical and obsessive crusade against the German people.
Heil og Sæl
Julius Streiker
Home to Web-page
Top
of Norw. WW 2 History